Warsaw\u27s Wingspan over State Laws: Towards a Streamlined System of Recovery by Ras, Luis F.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 59 | Issue 3 Article 3
1994
Warsaw's Wingspan over State Laws: Towards a
Streamlined System of Recovery
Luis F. Ras
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Luis F. Ras, Warsaw's Wingspan over State Laws: Towards a Streamlined System of Recovery, 59 J. Air L. & Com. 587 (1994)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol59/iss3/3
WARSAW'S WINGSPAN OVER STATE LAWS:




T HE WARSAW CONVENTION for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation
by Air ("Warsaw Convention")' became part of the law of
the United States on October 29, 1934.2 By the time the
United States adopted the Warsaw Convention, most Eu-
ropean nations had already become members. Today,
most of the world's major countries adhere to its terms.'
The text of the Convention was the work product of two
international conferences 5 and an interim committee of
renowned international technical experts on aviation law.6
* Mr. Ras is an associate with the New York office of Lester, Schwab, Katz &
Dwyer. He is a graduate of Fordham University (B.A. 1987; J.D. 1990), and a
member of the American Bar Association's Air and Space Law Forum and the
Federal Bar Association's Transportation Law Section. A considerable portion of
his practice has been devoted to aviation, maritime and construction litigation.
I The Convention has been codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1993).
2 The Convention was approved by the advice and consent of the United States
Senate on June 15, 1934. 78 Cong. Rec. 11,582 (1934). President Franklin D.
Roosevelt signed the Convention on October 29, 1934.
3 In re Air Crash Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988, 928
F.2d 1267, 1271 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991).
4 See LEE S. KREINDLER, I AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 11.01[3] at 11-7 (1988)
(listing countries which are parties to the Convention).
The first conference took place in Paris in 1925, and the second took place in
Warsaw in 1929. See discussion in Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462,
1467 (11 th Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
6 The interim committee was referred to by the acronym C.I.T.E.J.A., which
stands for the French "Comit6 International Technique d'ExpertsJuridiques Ar-
iens." See id.
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The authors created the Convention at the dawn of the
commercial aviation industry,7 which at that time required
sound financial backing and insurance.8 The drafters' pri-
mary goals were to create common rules to regulate inter-
national air carriage, 9 as well as limit the potential liability
of commercial air carriers. The former goal has been es-
pecially important to the United States' continued assent
to the Convention,' 0 since the United States has never
been satisfied with the liability limits the provision has
set. 11
7 At the time the authors drafted the Convention, commercial aviation was in its
infancy. Only one regularly scheduled international flight from the United States
existed and ran from Key West, Florida, to Cuba. See In re Korean Air Lines Disas-
ter of Sept. 1, 1983, 664 F. Supp. 1463, 1470 (D.D. C. 1985), aff'd, 829 F.2d 1171
(D.C. Cir. 1987), affid sub nom., 490 U.S. 122 (1989); KREINDLER, supra note 4 at
11-2.
See Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1270-71; Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1467; Korean Air Lines, 664
F. Supp. at 1470.
9 Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1270; Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1467; Korean Air Lines, 664 F.
Supp. at 1465. Courts have cited numerous other goals of the Convention, includ-
ing: achieving uniformity as to documentation for tickets, waybills, and proce-
dures for dealing with claims arising out of international air transportation. See
Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1467 (citing Minutes, Second International Conference on Pri-
vate Aeronautical Law, October 4-12, 1929, Warsaw 13 (Robert C. Horner &
Didier Legrez trans., 1975)); Korean Air Lines, 664 F. Supp. at 1465.
10 One of the principal reasons the United States joined the Convention
stemmed from its desire for uniform laws governing carrier liability and a measure
of certainty in the application of those laws. Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1275; see also
Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1086 (2d Cir.) (citing Hague Protocol to Warsaw Con-
vention: Hearings Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 19
(1965)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).
I' See Korean Air Lines, 664 F. Supp. at 1465. The United States has grown in-
creasingly dissatisfied with the Warsaw limitation over the years. Id. Many courts
have questioned the necessity of any limitation given the continued growth of the
commercial airline industry. See, e.g., Reed, 555 F.2d at 1079 (expressing the
court's duty to enforce the treaties of the United States, regardless of whether
they are wise or unwise). The emerging consensus is that the industry is no
longer in need of special protection, and is capable of assuming the costs of the
damages occasioned by its passengers. See Ray B. Jeffreys, Comment, The Growth
of American Judicial Hostility to the Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention, 48 J.
AIR L. & COM. 805, 830 (1983).
The United States' open hostility to the Convention's liability limitation has
been constant since as early as 1935. See Korean Air Lines, 664 F. Supp. at 1465.
This hostility has been a catalyst to the addition of several protocols and agree-
ments to the Convention in an effort to increase the liability limitations. See gener-
ally id. at 1465-66, 1470.
In 1965, the United States' dissatisfaction culminated in its formal denunciation
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The Convention, according to its own terms, applies to
injuries or losses sustained in "all international transpor-
tation of persons, baggage, or goods performed by air-
craft for hire.' 2  The essential bargain it embodies
consists of shifting the burden of proof of the carrier's re-
sponsibility for such losses to the carrier in exchange for a
low limitation of the carrier's liability. 13
It should be noted that the Convention was not in-
tended to govern the entire relationship between air carri-
ers and passengers.' 4 By its very title, it was only meant to
unify certain rules relating to international transportation
by air, and does not propose to unify all such rules.' 5
Thus, the Convention does not apply at all to those as-
pects of the passenger-carrier relationship it does not ad-
dress.' 6 As to those aspects, the respective rights and
liabilities of the passenger and carrier fall outside the
scope of the Convention and are left to the local laws of
member states. ' 7
of the Convention pursuant to Article 39. See 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966). With the
airlines fearful of the United States' repudiation of the Convention, the stage was
set for the Montreal Agreement of 1966. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I.
Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REv. 497,
598-49 (1967). The Agreement applied to flights originating, terminating, or
having a stopping point in the United States. Id. at 596. It raised the carriers'
limit of liability to $75,000 and further provided that the carriers would waive
their due care defenses under Article 20. Id. at 596-97.
The Montreal Agreement was intended as an interim solution. Floyd, 872 F.2d
at 1468. It has turned out to be of far greater longevity and continues to be the
only increase of the original Warsaw Convention liability limitation recognized by
the United States. Id. The United States Senate has not ratified any other Con-
vention, Protocol, or Agreement since joining the original Convention. Korean Air
Lines, 664 F. Supp. at 1470.
12 49 U.S.C. § 1502, art. 1 (1993).
Is Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 11, at 500 (shifting of the burden of
proof, however, does not occur in cases of willful misconduct).
11 Minutes, Second International Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, Oc-
tober 4-12, 1929, Warsaw 13 (Robert C. Homer & Didier Legrez trans., 1975) at
188; see also id. at 134-35, 176, 182-83 (including statements of delegates empha-
sizing that the Convention was not intended to be an exhaustive tool for the unifi-
cation of rules governing international air transportation).
15 Id.
6 Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1481.
'7 See id.; Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co., 739 F.2d 130, 132-34 (3d Cir. 1984)
(holding that the occurrence forming the basis of plaintiff's suit was not an acci-
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The Convention's role as an instrument of internal U.S.
law has undergone a noticeable transformation since the
time it was approved by the United States Senate in 1934.
A majority of the early decisions interpreting the Conven-
tion held that it did not create its own causes of action for
damages, but instead merely created presumptions of lia-
bility against the carrier.' 8 However, today it is well set-
tled that the Convention itself creates independent causes
dent within the terms of Article 17 of the Convention and Warsaw claim was prop-
erly dismissed; thus, District Court erred in failing to reach state law claims), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1059 (1985).
It is well settled that when the Convention is inapplicable to a claim, it does not
serve as a bar to alternative theories of recovery. Id. at 135. Thus, the following
types of occurrences commonly fall outside the scope of the Convention:
(1) Those which do not constitute an accident within the terms of Article 17 of
the Convention. See, e.g., Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985) (passenger who
became deaf because of alleged negligent maintenance and operation of aircraft's
pressurization system was not a victim of an accident under the terms of Article
17); Abramson, 1739 F.2d at 131-33 (airline's alleged negligent refusal to help pas-
senger suffering from hernia did not constitute an accident within the meaning of
the Convention); Padilla v. Olympic Airways, 765 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(fall in airplane lavatory did not constitute accident).
(2) Those that did not occur in the course of embarking or disembarking within
the terms of Article 17. See, e.g., Buonocore v. Trans World Airways, Inc., 900
F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1990) (death of passenger by terrorist attack in public area of
airport was not in course of embarking or disembarking under Article 17); Marti-
nez Hernandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279, 284 (1st Cir. 1976) (death of passen-
gers by terrorist attack occurring after the passengers vacated the airplane did not
occur in the course of disembarking), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 950 (1977).
(3) Those which did not involve ticketed passengers within the terms of Article
17. See In re Mexico City Aircrash of Oct. 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1983)
(representatives of two decedents working as flight attendants on board accident
aircraft did not have any right of action under the Convention and were instead
limited to remedies provided by California workers' compensation statutes); In re
Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on Mar. 14, 1980, 705 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir.)
(carrier accepted passenger without delivering a passenger ticket), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 845 (1983); Sulewski v. Federal Express Corp., 749 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (aircraft mechanic was travelling as an employee rather than a passenger,
and thus terms of Convention did not apply), aff'd, 933 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1991).
18 The first American court to consider whether the Convention created a cause
of action was the Southern District of New York in Choy v. Pan Am. World Air-
ways Co., 1941 Am. Mar. Cas. 483 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding that Convention did not
create its own independent cause of action). The New York Supreme Court fell in
line with Choy in Wyman v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 43 N.Y.S.2d 420, 423 (Sup. Ct.
1943), afld, 59 N.E.2d 785 (1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 882 (1945), without elabo-
rating its reasoning. Thereafter, the Convention cause of action stood on its own
legs for one brief moment before being banished for some time. See Salamon v.
Koninklije Luchtvaart Maatschappij, N.V., 107 N.Y.S.2d 768, 771 (Sup. Ct. 1951)
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of action for damages for a passenger's personal injuries
and wrongful death,' 9 and for claims of lost or damaged
baggage or cargo.2 0  The United States Supreme Court
has not addressed this issue directly, 2 ' although it has
ruled that the Convention operates as a self-executing
treaty which does not require any implementing legisla-
tion by the signatories. 2
After leaping a conceptual hurdle to find that the Con-
vention creates its own independent causes of action,
courts have been forced to decide whether these causes of
action can co-exist with state-law-based claims in cases
falling under the scope of the Convention.2 3  Courts de-
(holding that Convention's Article 17 created its own independent causes of ac-
tion), afd, 120 N.Y.S. 917 (N.Y. App. Div. 1953).
When the Southern District of New York once again passed on the issue, other
courts followed suit. See Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1469 (referring to Komlos v. Compa-
gnie Nationale Air France, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953) (holding that the Conven-
tion does not create its own independent cause of action), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 820
(1954); Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.) (holding that
the Convention does not create its own independent cause of action), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 907 (1957). These were the seminal decisions followed by courts around
the country for two decades.
19 It was not until 1978, whenJudge Lambert of the Second Circuit reversed his
Noel opinion in Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir.
1978) (finding that Convention creates its own independent cause of action), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979), that the previous rule was decisively overturned.
The new rule ushered in by Benjamins became the standard bearer for the Conven-
tion cause of action and is now the universal rule. See Floyd 872 F.2d at 1470
(Article 17 creates cause of action for personal injury); In re Mexico City Aircrash
of Oct. 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 415 (9th Cir. 1983) (Article 17 creates a cause of
action for wrongful death founded in treaty law).
20 See, e.g., St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Venezuelan Int'l, 807 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir.
1987) (holding that Articles 18, 21, and 28 created a cause of action against carri-
ers for lost cargo).
21 The United States Supreme Court has not expressly decided whether the
Convention creates causes of action. Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1469. However, in Air
France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 408 (1985), the court implicitly recognized a War-
saw cause of action by stating in dicta that an airline could be held liable to the
victim of an accident under Article 17.
22 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984).
22 See, e.g., Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1480 (forcing court to determine whether Conven-
tion preempts plaintiffs' state law cause of action because of possibility that plain-
tiffs could be entitled to recover for the same injuries under both Florida state law
and the Convention).
Some courts would also hold that non-Warsaw federal causes of action should
be available in actions falling within the scope of the Convention. See In re Air
Disaster Near Honolulu, Hawaii on Feb. 24, 1989, 792 F. Supp. 1541 (N.D. Cal.
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fine the issue as one concerning the exclusivity or non-
exclusivity of the Warsaw cause of action. Those courts
holding that the Warsaw cause of action is exclusive inter-
pret the cause of action to preempt all state-based causes
of action for cases falling within the scope of the Conven-
tion. Those courts holding that the Warsaw cause of ac-
tion is not exclusive interpret the Convention to allow for
the availability of state causes of action alongside Warsaw
causes of action for cases falling within the scope of the
Convention. The issue remains open, with the United
States Supreme Court remaining silent on the question. 24
Part I of this Article will discuss the cases supporting
the view that the Warsaw cause of action is not exclusive
and thus does not automatically preempt all state-law-
based causes of action (the "restrictive view"). Part II will
discuss the substantive and procedural problems inherent
in the restrictive view and review the cases supporting the
position that the Warsaw cause of action is exclusive once
a loss falls within the scope of the Convention (the "ex-
pansive view"). Under the latter view, all state causes of
action are automatically preempted once such a loss oc-
curs. Part III will discuss analogous problems in the gen-
1990) (considering whether plaintiffis general maritime law claim for punitive
damages was preempted by the Convention in case falling under the scope of the
Convention). Although the Honolulu court found that the punitive damages claims
would not be allowable absent a finding of willful misconduct, it did not foreclose
the recovery of punitive damages under the general maritime law. Id. at 1548-50.
The court suggested that punitive damages might be available under the general
maritime law even if they were not available under the Warsaw Convention. Id. at
1544, 1551 n.4.
Courts have paid little attention to the issue of whether federal non-Warsaw
causes of action are available in actions falling under the scope of the Convention.
It is the author's opinion, however, that the issue of the availability of non-Warsaw
federal causes of action for actions within the scope of the Convention should be
treated the same way as the issue of the availability of state-based causes of action.
This article discusses the latter issue.
24 See Onyeanusi v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 952 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1992)
(discussing whether the Convention provides exclusive cause of action which pre-
cludes state causes of action since the United States Supreme Court has declined
to resolve the issue in two recent cases) (citing Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991); Air
France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985)).
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eral maritime law of the United States, and how courts
have dealt with them.
This article makes the case that the Convention should
be recognized as the exclusive source of a claimant's right
to recover once an action falls under its scope. Once trig-
gered, actions falling under its scope should be decided
under principles of federal common law uniformly devel-
oped by the federal courts in keeping with the Conven-
tion's objectives.
The first way to accomplish this goal would be to de-
clare the Convention's cause of action to be exclusive,
thus preempting all state-based causes of action (i.e. adopt-
ing the expansive view). The second way would be to al-
low plaintiffs to plead state-based causes of action while
deciding those claims exclusively in terms of substantive
federal common law. Both methods would be equally ef-
fective to ensure that the Convention effectuates its im-
portant goal of international and intranational uniformity
in its systems of recovery and the law applicable to claims.
PART I. THE RESTRICTIVE VIEW: WARSAW AS A
NON-EXCLUSIVE REMEDY
The case of Benjamins v. British European Airways solved
the controversy over whether the Convention created its
own independent causes of action for damages. 5 It did
not, however, put to rest the equally important issue of
whether state causes of action were still available under
the Convention.2 6 Plainly stated, the issue that presently
divides the judiciary is whether the Convention automati-
cally preempts state causes of action once the facts of a
claim make it fall within the scope of the Convention.27
25 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978); see also supra note 19.
26 See generally In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988, 928
F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991); Benjamins, 572 F.2d at 913.
27 See Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1273. The issue is not whether the Convention
preempts state laws with which it is in direct conflict. Id.; see also Boehringer
Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 737 F.2d 456 (5th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1186 (1985). In such a situation, the Constitu-
tion's Supremacy Clause would call for preemption of the state law cause of ac-
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The difficulties in interpreting the Convention arise from
the Convention itself. Several courts that have been
forced to wrestle with this issue have identified the Con-
vention's failure to squarely address it.28 The Convention
does not expressly preserve state law causes of action.29
However, it does not expressly preempt state law causes
of action either. 0 In addition, it creates confusion by pro-
viding causes of action without expressly defining their
role within the internal law systems of member states.'
The federal district courts of the Eleventh Circuit have
long wrestled with the issue of whether the Convention's
remedies are exclusive. 2 The majority of Florida District
Court judges that have had occasion to review the issue
have concluded that the cause of action created by the
Convention is not exclusive. At least one Florida state
court has followed this view as well. 4
tion. See U.S. CONST. art. VI. Likewise, the issue is not whether plaintiffs may
raise state-law-based causes of action arising from occurrences falling outside the
scope of the Convention. See supra note 17. It is clear that under those circum-
stances, plaintiffs may raise a state cause of action. Id.
21 The problem with Warsaw's ambiguity has been traced back to the Warsaw
Conference debates themselves. See Jack v. Trans World Airlines, 820 F. Supp.
1218, 1225 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (commenting that the Warsaw Conference debates
were more notable for their lack of discussion regarding preemption than they are
for any comments made on the subject).
29 See id. (commenting that various authorities supported its conclusion that the
Convention itself does not expressly preserve state law causes of action).
so See Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1273 (commenting that neither the Convention itself
nor any Congressional action at the time the United States adhered to the Con-
vention expressly preempted state law); Boehringer, 737 F.2d at 459 (stating that
the Convention does not expressly preempt state law).
11 See In re Mexico City Aircrash on Oct. 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 409 (9th Cir.
1983) (citing Choy v. Pan American Airways Co., 1941 Am. Mar. Cas. 483, 488
(S.D.N.Y. 1941)) (holding that the Convention has no enabling act vesting the
ownership or the beneficiaries of a cause of action; thus, the Convention cannot
create a cause of action because it would not be definable or enforceable); Alvarez
v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 756 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
(holding that the Convention was unconcerned with the manner in which a forum
determined the substance of its local law, and whether the applicable local sub-
stantive law was the result of state or national law within a federal system of
government).
32 See Clark v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 1209, 1210 (S.D. Fla.
1991).
33 Id.
14 See King v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 536 So. 2d 1023, 1031 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
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The latest Florida District Court case to squarely ad-
dress this issue is Clark. Clark involved a claim for the loss
of cargo shipped from Guyana to England. 5 Plaintiff
Clark brought suit in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court
of Dade County, Florida, asserting claims based solely on
Florida state law. The defendant subsequently removed
the action to the District Court for the Southern District
of Florida, and plaintiff moved to remand the action back
to state court.
The Court held that the cause of action created by the
Convention was not meant to be exclusive, 36 and re-
manded the action back to state court.37 Its reasoning fo-
cused on the language of Article 24(1) of the Convention,
which provides that "any action for damages, however
founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions
and limits set forth in the Convention. 938
Three recent decisions from the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida also fall into line with the ma-
jority. In Alvarez v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. ,3
Calderon v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. 40 and Rhymes
v. Arrow Air, Inc. 4t the courts granted Plaintiffs' motions to
remand their actions to state court. Plaintiffs in all three
1987); Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. King, 557 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1990). The Third Dis-
trict Court of the State of Florida held that plaintiff could assert a cause of action
for emotional distress under state law in a Warsaw Convention case. King, 536 So.
2d at 1031. The Supreme Court of Florida, however, decided that plaintiff had
not pleaded sufficient facts to state a claim under state law, thereby making the
preemption issue moot. Eastern Airlines, 557 So. 2d at 575-76 (holding that it was
unnecessary to pass on issue of whether state cause of action was preempted by
Convention cause of action for emotional distress recognized in Floyd because
plaintiff had not plead sufficient facts to uphold state claim). In a later twist, the
United States Supreme Court, on an appeal in the then-pending Floyd action,
found that the Convention did not provide a cause of action for purely mental
injury. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
'~ See Clark, 778 F. Supp. at 1210.
Id. at 1211.
37 Id.
s, Id. (citing Rhymes v. Arrow Air, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 737 (S.D. Fla. 1986)).
39 756 F. Supp. 550, 556 (S.D. Fla, 1991).
4o 738 F. Supp. 485, 487 (S.D. Fla. 1990), appeal dismissed, 929 F.2d 1572 (11 th
Cir.), cert. denied, 1112 S. Ct. 376 (1991).
11 636 F. Supp. 737 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
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cases had brought their actions in state court and had ex-
clusively based them on state causes of action. In the
three respective decisions, the courts held that the Con-
vention provides only an exclusive remedy, and not an ex-
clusive cause of action.42 These conclusions were also
based in large part upon the "however founded" lan-
guage found in Article 24(1) of the Convention.43
It is important to note that only one Florida District
Court has gone on record in favor of the view that the
Convention's causes of action are exclusive.44 The issue
has been brought up only once in the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals. 45 On that occasion, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit Court expressly declined to address the issue.4 6
Several other district courts across the country have
42 An exclusive "remedy" would allow for the availability of state law claims
subject (at least) to the Convention's $75,000 liability limitation. See Alvarez, 756 F.
Supp. at 555; Calderon, 738 F. Supp. at 486; Rhymes, 636 F. Supp. at 740.
41 See Alvarez, 756 F. Supp. at 554; Calderon, 738 F. Supp. at 486 (stating that the
Convention, rather than supplying an exclusive cause of action, provides only an
exclusive remedy for such actions); Rhymes, 636 F. Supp. at 740.
44 DistrictJudge Scott, sitting in Velasquez v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A., 747 F. Supp. 670, 676 (S.D. Fla. 1990) held that Warsaw causes of action for
death and personal injury were exclusive. The court heard the issue on plaintiffs'
motion for remand to state court, and the court denied plaintiffs' motion. See
Clark, 778 F. Supp. at 1210-11 (Only Judge Scott has held that the Convention
provides an exclusive cause of action.).
Other unreported cases in the Southern District of Florida have also followed
the restrictive view. See, e.g., Schuster v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., No. 83-
1292 (S.D. Fla., June 17, 1983); Schuh v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., No. 83-
1294 (S.D. Fla. June 17, 1983); Lebreton v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., No. 82-
1289 (S.D. Fla., June 6, 1983); Quinion v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., No. 82-
1769 (S.D. Fla., Sept. 30, 1982); Dara v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., No. 82-
2151 (S.D. Fla., Oct. 25, 1982).
45 See Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, 872 F.2d 1462, 1482 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd on
other grounds, 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
46 See Clark, 778 F.2d at 1210; Alvarez, 756 F. Supp. at 552 (citing Floyd, which
declined to speculate on the issue of whether Warsaw entirely preempts state law
causes of action once its provisions are triggered by an accident within the mean-
ing of Article 17). However, the Floyd court held that Florida law is preempted to
the extent that it conflicts with the cause of action under the Convention. Floyd,
872 F.2d at 1481. This part of Floyd's holding became moot when the Florida
Supreme Court held in a related case that plaintiff King had failed to state any
claim for emotional distress under Florida law. See King v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
557 So. 2d 574, 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1480 n.18. It is
unclear whether any of the Floyd plaintiffs were able to sufficiently state an emo-
tional distress claim under Florida state law.
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also held that a Warsaw Convention cause of action is not
exclusive. There are two such decisions from District
Courts in the Tenth Circuit.
In Hill v. United Airlines47 plaintiffs alleged causes of ac-
tion for defendant's intentional misrepresentation as to
the causes of delays on their flight. Although the Hill
court did not spell out the exact basis of plaintiffs' claims,
plaintiffs' causes of action were at least partially based on
state laws.48 Defendant argued that all of plaintiffs' causes
of action which were not based on the Convention should
be dismissed. The court held the Convention, as a treaty,
preempts only local laws which conflict with it.49
Eight years later in Morgan v. United Air Lines, Inc. the
court followed Hill.50 Morgan considered the more limited
procedural issue of whether state choice of law rules
should be preempted in a Warsaw Convention case in
favor of federal common law choice of law rules. The
court held that in diversity cases under the Convention,
state choice of law principles should be used.5 Its hold-
ing however, was based on Hill's reasoning. Morgan stated
in dicta that "state law claims are not completely pre-
empted unless they conflict with the terms of the
[C]onvention." 52
In In re Air Crash Disaster at Gander, Newfoundland on Dec.
12, 1985,5s plaintiffs brought Warsaw Convention claims
against the carrier along with state law claims against the
47 550 F. Supp. 1048, 1054 (D. Kan. 1982).
48 Id. at 1049 (alleging the tort of intentional misrepresentation, and defendant
brought a motion to dismiss arguing that the suit was controlled by the Conven-
tion); see also id. at 1054 (alleging a conflict between plaintiffs cause of action for
misrepresentation and the Convention's rules of liability by defendant, and argu-
ing that plaintiffs' right to damages, if any, must be found within the terms of the
Convention itself).
49 The court elaborated on this point in further detail. See id. There is no re-
quirement or prerequisite that plaintiffs state their cause of action in terms of the
Convention. It is important to note that the court did find that the actions were
under the scope of the Convention. Id. at 1056.
50 750 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Colo. 1990).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 1051.
-1 660 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D. Ky. 1987).
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carrier's agents. One of the principal issues before the
court was whether the District court could exercise pen-
dent jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims against
the carrier's agents. Plaintiffs' state law claims were for
negligent service and maintenance of the aircraft.54 The
court held that causes of action under the Convention
preempted any aspects of other actions, "however
founded", to the extent that such actions are in conflict
with the Convention. 55
The Gander court recognized that Plaintiffs' state claims
would fall under the scope and limitations of the Conven-
tion because they were against agents of the carrier and
thus exposed the carrier to secondary liability. 56 It is sig-
nificant that despite this acknowledgement, the court al-
lowed the state law claims to go forward. By
recognizing the state law claims, the court effectively held
that the Warsaw cause of action was not exclusive and
thus did not automatically preempt all state laws.
Several decisions within the Ninth Circuit have also ex-
pressed support for the restrictive view. Johnson v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc. 58 involved a claim for damage to a casket,
theft of personal property, and damage to human remains
during shipment. The court held that the Ninth Circuit
did not recognize Warsaw as the exclusive remedy for
claims within its scope. 59 This pronouncement was in
dicta, however, as the court also found that plaintiffs
Id. at 1206.
Id. at 1221 n.43.
56 Id. at 1221. Almost all courts that have passed on the issue of whether a
carrier's agents are entitled to the protection of the Warsaw Convention limitation
have uniformly accorded agents such protection. See, e.g., Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d
1079 (2d Cir.) (agents protected by Warsaw Convention liability limit), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 922 (1977); In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988,
776 F. Supp. 710 (E.D.N.Y.), affid in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 928 F.2d
1267 (2d Cir. 1991); Chutter v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 132 F. Supp. 611, 613
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (agents protected). But see Pierre v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 152 F.
Supp. 486, 489 (D.N.J. 1957) (agents of carrier not protected by treaty limitation).
57 Gander, 660 F. Supp. at 1222 (holding that it would exercise pendent jurisdic-
tion over plaintiffis state law claims against carrier's agents).
V, 834 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1987).
59 Id. at 723.
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failed to state a claim under state law.60
In In re Mexico City Aircrash of October 31, 197961 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed its support for
the restrictive view through its comment in dicta on the
"however founded" language of Article 24(1). In the
words of the court: "[t]he best explanation for the word-
ing of Article 24(1) appears to be that the delegates did
not intend that [sic] the cause of action created by the
Convention to be exclusive. '62 Mexico City involved claims
by Plaintiffs on behalf of airline employees killed in the
crash of a Western jetliner en route to Mexico City. The
main issue before the court was whether plaintiffs' claims
should be governed by California's workers' compensa-
tion statute or, alternatively, the Warsaw Convention.63
Thus, the court was not passing on the exclusivity of War-
saw's cause of action, but rather the exclusivity of Califor-
nia's workers' compensation statute in governing
Plaintiffs' recoveries for the wrongful death of their
decedents .64
The Northern District of California followed Mexico City
6 Id.
61 708 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1983).
62 Id. at 414 n.25.
61 Id. at 404. Plaintiffs' decedents were all flight attendants employed by the
defendant carrier at the time of the subject crash. Id. at 403. Decedents Haley
and Tovar were on duty aboard the subject flight and plaintiffs did not contest the
fact that these decedents were aboard the flight in their capacities as employees.
Id. at 417. Plaintiff Dzida did challenge defendant's motion to dismiss on the
grounds that his decedent was not on board the flight in her capacity as an em-
ployee. Id. at 463. Although all plaintiffs apparently pleaded causes of action
under the Convention, only plaintiff Dzida made the argument that his decedent
was not travelling as an employee. Id. at 417. Without such an argument, the
Convention, which applies only to passengers, could not serve as a ground for a
cause of action. Id. at 416 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1502, art. 17).
- See id. at 418 (determining that the Convention preempts exclusivity of Cali-
fornia's workers' compensation law). The three cases before the court were those
of decedents Haley, Tovar, and Dzida. Id. at 405. The court ruled that plaintiffs
Haley and Tovar were not entitled to a Convention cause of action. Id. at 417.
The court, however, reversed the district court's summary dismissal of plaintiff
Dzida's Warsaw claim and remanded the matter for a factual inquiry to determine
whether decedent could be considered a passenger, as required in order to have
an action under the Convention. Id. at 417-18. Consequently, none of the three
cases presented the issue of whether a Warsaw Convention cause of action was
exclusive and preempted all state-law-based causes of action once triggered.
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in In re Air Disaster Near Honolulu, Hawaii on February 24,
1989.65 This case involved causes of action under War-
saw, the Death on the High Seas Act, and the general mar-
itime law for injuries arising out of the mid-air separation
of an aircraft's cargo door and a portion of its fuselage.6 6
Plaintiffs contended that the Convention did not pre-
empt their claim for punitive damages under the general
maritime law.67 The Court held that although the Warsaw
cause of action was not exclusive,6 8 the scheme of recov-
ery contemplated by the Convention did not allow for pu-
nitive damages (regardless of the substantive legal basis
for the claim) absent a showing of wilful misconduct.69
Courts in the Second Circuit have wavered on the ques-
tion of Warsaw Convention's exclusivity. To date, few
cases within the Second Circuit have touched on the sub-
ject. Of those, only Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Co. v. Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp., has gone along with the restrictive
view. 70 Plaintiffs' claims in Tokio were for contribution
and indemnity, and did not directly involve the issue of
the Convention's exclusivity. 71 The court stated in dicta
that the Convention's draftsmen had not intended for the
Convention cause of action to be exclusive.72
65 792 F. Supp. 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
- Id. at 1542-43.
617 Id. at 1548.
Id. at 1548 n.15.
6 Id. at 1550. The Court did not expressly decide whether the Convention
allows the recovery of punitive damages where there has been a showing of wilful
misconduct. Id.
70 617 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1980). The Second Circuit cases which follow the ex-
pansive view are discussed in Part II. infra.
71 Id. at 938. Plaintiff's insured had paid out on passenger claims which had
been based on both state tort law and the Convention. Id. at 938. One of the
issues before the court was whether plaintiff's insured could be considered a set-
tling tortfeasor under state law in order to be released from liability for contribu-
tion and indemnity. Id. at 941-42. The issue whether the passengers' Warsaw
Convention's claims against plaintiff's insured were exclusive or not did not affect
the Tokio court's holding. Id. The court decided that whether or not the Warsaw
claims were exclusive, plaintiff was entitled to protection from contribution and
indemnity claims as a settling tortfeasor because the passenger claims settled by
plaintiff's insured had included state tort claims. Id.
72 Id. at 941-42. The court in Halmos v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 727 F.
Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), provided yet another clear example of the judicial
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A cursory review of the cases espousing the restrictive
view reveals certain commonalities. For instance, the ma-
jority explicitly rely on the "however founded" language
of Article 24(1) of the Convention to allow plaintiffs to
resort to state causes of action in cases governed by the
Convention.73 Article 24 states:
(1) In cases governed by articles 18 [goods and luggage]
and 19 [delays] any action for damages, however founded,
can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits
set out in this convention.
(2) In the cases covered by article 17 [personal injury
and death] the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall
also apply, without prejudice to the questions as to who
are the persons who have the right to bring suit and what
are their respective rights.74
Specifically, these courts interpret the "however
founded" language to mean that actions for damages can
be founded on the Convention or some other law.75
These courts also agree with the principle that the Con-
vention does not create exclusive causes of action, but
preempts any local law that is inconsistent with its provi-
sions.76 This result is mandated by the Constitution's
confusion surrounding the Convention's status in the internal law of the United
States. The court in Halmos, without expressing its reasoning, held that the Con-
vention did not create an independent cause of action. Id. at 123. This holding
came a full eleven years after the Second Circuit itself had definitively decided that
the Convention created an independent cause of action. See Benjamins v. British
European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 919 (2d Cir. 1978); supra note 19 and accompa-
nying text.
73 See, e.g., Alvarez, 756 F. Supp. at 555 (noting that courts that rely on com-
ments of official Convention delegates that desired to eliminate all reference to
laws of the various sovereign nations fail to give the proper import to the Conven-
tion's "however founded" language).
74 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 24.
75 Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 1218, 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
76 See Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1482 n.33. Courts adhering to the restrictive view do
not consider the mere availability of state causes of action to be inconsistent the
Convention. Thus, plaintiffs in these courts could be able to prove and recover
damages available under state law, albeit subject to the Convention's liability
limit. In cases where wilful misconduct is proven, damages could vary signifi-
cantly depending on which state's laws were chosen. See, e.g., id. at 1479 (noting
that state law causes of action are not uniformly available, and plaintiffs which
could avail themselves of state law would be able to pursue state law causes of
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Supremacy Clause, which invalidates state laws that con-
flict with a treaty.77 Lastly, courts adopting the restrictive
view all implicitly or explicitly hold that the availability of
such causes of action is consistent with the scheme of re-
covery established by the Convention.78
The net result of the restrictive view is that it allows for
state-law-based causes of action to be plead in state
courts. This opens the door to forum-shopping for state
laws that often have the potential to permit recovery of
more generous or additional elements of damages. In
most cases, the potential difference in recoverable dam-
ages is tempered by the Convention's liability limitation.79
The limitation, however, does not apply in cases of wilful
misconduct.8 In addition, as will be discussed in the next
section, such liberties can produce widely divergent re-
sults for different plaintiffs within the same litigation.8"
Such results undermine the Warsaw system's objectives of
uniformity and predictability.
PART II. THE EXPANSIVE VIEW: THE
RATIONALE AND SUPPORTERS OF AN
EXCLUSIVE CAUSE OF ACTION
UNDER THE CONVENTION
There is no shortage of legal problems to be addressed
action which allowed recovery for different elements of damages in different
states).
77 See U.S. CoNsT., art. VI, cl. 2.
78 See, e.g., Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1485 (declining to hold that Warsaw Convention
cause of action is exclusive, and stating that the issue was "whether an award of...
damages [under a state law cause of action] would conflict with the scheme of
liability provided for in the Convention").
79 The Convention, as currently adopted in the United States, limits liability for
passenger injury or death to $75,000. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept.
1, 1983, 664 F. Supp. 1463, 1466 (D.D.C. 1985), aft'd, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1221 (1989). In cargo cases, the liability limitation is
$9.07 per pound. See, e.g., Maritime Ins. Co. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 769 F.
Supp. 126, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
80 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 25. For a discussion of the willful mis-
conduct exception, see Ospina v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 975 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1944 (1993).
"I See infra Part II.
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in international aviation disasters where the structure and
limits of the Convention do not apply. 2 In fact, the trans-
national melange of passengers aboard today's commer-
cial passenger aircraft can sometimes set the stage for a
proverbial "judicial nightmare" in the wake of an unfortu-
nate air tragedy.83 Courts faced with such cases must ap-
ply a potpourri of local laws to victims of the same
accident.8 4
The principal benefits of the Warsaw Convention sys-
tem are derived from its efforts to create a uniform body
of substantive aviation liability law applicable regardless
of the place of injury, the domicile of the passenger or
shipper, or the nationality of the airline involved. 5 The
Convention itself indicates the necessity for uniformity
and the desire for a comprehensive set of rules in those
areas where the signatories intended the Convention to
apply.8 6 Its interest in uniformity does not stop at the
United States border, but applies within the United States
as well.8 7 Uniform rules of law allow carriers and passen-
gers to be somewhat certain of their legal relationship
with each other and enable them to act accordingly. 8
Several courts have explicitly recognized that the availa-
bility of state causes of action threatens the uniformity en-
visioned by the Convention.8 9  The problems can be
82 See Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1091-92 n.18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
922 (1977); infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
Is See, e.g., Forsyth v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 520 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1975); In re
Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (involving
203 suits by representatives of 337 decedents based mostly on products liability
claims against American aircraft manufacturer of Turkish-owned aircraft that
crashed in France; decedents on board were from 24 countries and 12 states of
the United States, and claimants were from an additional two countries).
84 See Reed, 555 F.2d at 1091-92 n.18.
,5 See Reed, 555 F.2d at 1090-91 (citing Committee Hearings on Adoption of the Hague
Protocol); see supra note 11.
86 Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1488.
"I See Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 737
F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1186 (1985); Floyd, 572 at
1488.
18 Reed, 555 F.2d at 1091.
"9 See, e.g., In re Air Crash at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988, 928 F.2d
1267, 1275 (2d. Cir.) (stating that it could not see how the existence of state law
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many-fold. For example, carriers could be exposed to
fifty separate and distinct causes of action for personal in-
jury in this country alone. 90 In addition, the possibility of
asserting both federal and state causes of action for the
same injury could create a situation where different proce-
dural and substantive laws would apply to the same indi-
vidual's case depending on the way the particular plaintiff
chooses to structure his complaint.
The case of Rhymes v. Arrow Air, Inc. ,91 provides a good
illustration. In Rhymes the court held that an action under
the scope of the Convention could be brought in one of
four ways: 1) plaintiff could bring his complaint in federal
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction; 2) plaintiff
could file in federal court and allege his cause of action
under the Convention alone, thereby triggering the
court's federal question jurisdiction; 3) plaintiff could
bring the action in state court under both state law and
Convention causes of action; and 4) plaintiff could bring
the action in state court based exclusively on state law.92
In Morgan v. United Airlines, Inc.93 the court dealt with
the very choice of law problems alluded to in Rhymes.
This case made a distinction between the choice of law
rules which would apply to cases94 brought under diver-
sity jurisdiction, 95 and those brought under the court's
causes of action could fail to frustrate the Convention's goals of uniformity of laws
and certainty in their application), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991); Velasquez v.
Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 747 F. Supp. 670, 676 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(stating that it would make little sense to hold that the Convention allows separate
state law causes of action, given the Convention's concern for uniformity).
'o This would be the case if courts around the country allowed state causes of
action to proceed, as some do now. See supra Part I. This raises the distinct possi-
bility that a carrier could expose itself to separate and distinct causes of action in
each state that allowed state causes of action to be asserted. See also Lockerbie, 928
F.2d at 1275 (noting that on airline's liability could vary widely based on where
plaintiffs resided or chose to sue).
91 636 F. Supp. 737 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
92 Rhymes, 636 F. Supp. at 741.
9 750 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Colo. 1990).
The court's reference was to actions falling under the scope of the Conven-
tion. See id. at 1051-53.
95 State-law-based claims would rely on the court's diversity jurisdiction. Id. at
1052.
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federal question jurisdiction. 96 The court held that Colo-
rado's choice of law principles should be used in actions
based on diversity, 97 and implied that federal choice of
law principles should be used in actions involving federal
question jurisdiction.98 Thus, the availability of state law
causes of action disturbs the uniformity of remedies avail-
able in actions falling under the Convention's scope. The
availability of state law causes of action would also lead to
difficulties in choosing the procedural law to be applied in
the action.
Other important aspects of litigants' substantive rights
could also be decided differently in cases arising out of
the same disaster. For example, a court could agree to
give a jury trial to plaintiffs who had plead a cause of ac-
tion under the Convention while denying it to those who
had not. 99 State causes of action could also provide vary-
ing measures of damages or varying specifications of per-
sons entitled to recover damages. 00
In view of the difficulties encountered with concurrent
state and federal causes of action, several courts have con-
cluded that the Convention is to be both the exclusive av-
enue of recovery and the exclusive remedy' 0 ' in the areas
9 Id.
97 Id. at 1052-53. Courts favoring the exclusivity of the Convention cause of
action have seen the possibility of differing jurisdictional bases as a problem. See,
e.g., Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1275 (commenting that the use of state substantive laws
to construe the Convention coupled with an assertion of diversity jurisdiction
could result in the inconsistent application of law to the claims before it).
98 Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1275. In a single case involving Convention-created
and state-created causes of action that each allowed recovery for different ele-
ments of damages, there could be two distinct bodies of substantive law applicable
to the same case. Id. at 1275. This would present the further problem of whether
to apply federal choice of law rules to the Convention causes of action alone while
applying state choice of law rules to the state causes of action at the same time; or
applying the forum state's choice of law rules to all causes of action regardless of
whether they are state-based or Convention-based, thereby treating the whole
case as one arising under diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 1276.
99 See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 704 F. Supp. 1135, 1154-
55 (D.D.C. 1988).
-oo See In re Mexico City Aircrash of Oct. 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 414 n.25 (9th
Cir. 1983).
10, The courts holding that the Warsaw Convention is only an exclusive remedy
favor the restrictive view.
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where it governs.' In In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie the is-
sue before the Second Circuit was whether plaintiffs could
bring claims for punitive damages against the carrier. 0 3
The court considered whether such claims could be rec-
ognized under state or federal law, and thus reached the
issue of whether state law claims are preempted in actions
governed by the Convention. 0 4
In the first part of its analysis, the court concluded that
the Convention did not preserve state causes of action.10 5
It then went on to hold that the Convention impliedly
preempts state law because its subject matter demands a
degree of uniformity that would be frustrated by allowing
state regulation in that area. 10 6 The court reasoned that
such regulation cannot fit within the Warsaw system, since
state statutes can differ significantly as to the elements,
measure, and distribution of damages. 10 7
Another recent case within the Second Circuit has also
held that the Warsaw cause of action is exclusive. In Sas-
souni v. Olympic Airways' 0 8 plaintiff claimed damages for be-
ing denied boarding due to the alleged over booking of
his flight. The court held that plaintiff's cause of action
was governed by Article 19 of the Convention, and that
the Convention's cause of action provided the exclusive
remedy for plaintiff's claim.'0 9
The Fifth Circuit has also come down on the side of the
Convention's exclusivity. The case of Boehringer-Mannheim
102 See generally Floyd, 827 F.2d at 1482 n.33 (summarizing several cases that
have addressed the issue of whether Warsaw is the exclusive cause of action in
occurrences falling under its scope).
103 Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1269-70.
04 Id. at 1273.
o, Id. at 1273-74.
10, Id. at 1274-75.
107 Id. at 1278.
10 769 F. Supp. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
19 Id. at 539. One earlier decision within the Second Circuit also supports the
expansive view. See In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on Mar. 14, 1980,
535 F. Supp. 833, 844-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that the Convention specifi-
cally and exclusively governs all claims for damages arising out of the death or
injury of a passenger engaged in international air transportation), affid, 705 F.2d
85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983).
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Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 110 in-
volved a shipper's action against the carrier for damage to
cargo."' The shipper brought a negligence action under
Texas law coupled with an action based on the Conven-
tion."t 2 The Fifth Circuit denied plaintiff's claims for at-
torneys' fees, which were allowable under Texas law, and
held that "the Warsaw Convention creates the controlling
cause of action ... [and] preempts state law in the areas
covered." " 13
In Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co., Ltd. the Third Circuit
implied that it would hold that the Convention's cause of
action is exclusive." 4 This implication was merely dicta
due to the fact that plaintiff's action did not constitute an
accident within the meaning of the Convention and thus
fell outside its scope.' ' 5
The Third Circuit followed Abramson's reasoning in
Onyeanusi v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. Onyeanusi in-
volved a claim for damage to, and delayed arrival of,
human remains." 6 Plaintiff argued that the Convention
did not apply because the human remains did not consti-
tute "goods" under Article 1(1) of the Convention." 7
The Court ruled that the Convention applied to plaintiff's
claim, and that where the Convention applies, it is the ex-
clusive remedy for actions against air carriers." 8
One case within the First Circuit has squarely addressed
the issue. Diaz Lugo v. American Airlines, Inc. "9 involved a
passenger's claims arising from injuries sustained when a
110 737 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1186 (1985).
III Id. at 457-58.
112 Id.
I's Id. at 459.
114 739 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that actions could be brought under
local law when there had been no "accident" within the meaning of the Conven-
tion, and that courts had similarly concluded that the Convention cause of action
is only exclusive when it applies), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1059 (1985).
115 Id. at 135.
116 952 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1992).
117 Id. at 790.
118 Id. at 793.
119 686 F. Supp. 373 (D.P.R. 1988).
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flight attendant spilled coffee on her. The court ruled
that the occurrence constituted an "accident" within the
meaning of the Convention, thus triggering its terms. 121
The court went on to dismiss those claims grounded in
local law after holding that the Convention's limitation
and theory of liability were exclusive where the Conven-
tion applied.12 '
The United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois has also had occasion to pass on the issue
of Warsaw's exclusivity. In Harpalani v. Air India, Inc. the
court dismissed those claims that were based on theories
other than the Convention. 122 The court held that the
Convention provides the exclusive remedy and preempts
other state or federal law claims.' 23 The Warsaw Conven-
tion claims raised in this case were for denied boarding
compensation, which the Seventh Circuit held was not
compensable under the Convention in a later unrelated
case. 124
One decision from the Southern District of Florida also
aligns itself with the exclusivity view. Velasquez v. Aerovias
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. involved plaintiffs motion to
remand his action back to state court. 125 Defendant Avi-
anca's argument in opposition was that the actions were
properly removable to the federal court because the Con-
vention provided the sole cause of action under which the
victim of an international air disaster could proceed. 1 6
Plaintiff grounded his causes of action strictly in terms of
the Florida Wrongful Death Act 2 7 and made no reference
to a federal cause of action in his complaints. 128
120 Id. at 375.
21 Id. at 376. The Convention applied in plaintiff's case because all of the con-
ditions for a cause of action under Article 17 had been met. Id.
12 622 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. I1. 1985).
123 Id.
12 4 See Wolgel v. Mexicana Airlines, 821 F.2d 442, 445 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 927 (1987).
12. 747 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
126 Id. at 672.
127 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 768.16-.27 (West 1993).
128 Velasquez, 747 F. Supp. at 671.
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The Velasquez court went on to recognize the Conven-
tion cause of action as exclusive.' 29 The court also noted
that actions under the scope of the Convention could be
brought in either state or federal court. 3 0 Unlike the de-
cisions made in other cases in the Southern District of
Florida, however, the court explicitly stated that a Warsaw
action brought in state court could be removed to federal
court at the defendant's option.'13
One recent decision in the Northern District of Califor-
nia illustrates that the controversy over Warsaw's exclu-
sivity is far from resolved within the Eleventh Circuit. In
Jack v. Trans World Airlines the court came to the conclu-
sion that the Convention's cause of action is exclusive
based on its review of the 1928 working draft drawn up by
CITEJA. 3 2 The court further noted that Article 24(1)
would have little purpose if it meant merely that the Con-
vention's conditions and limits preempt inconsistent pro-
visions of local law.' 3 3
In sum, courts adhering to the exclusivity view agree
that it is contrary to the Convention's liability scheme to
allow plaintiffs to assert state-based causes of action in
cases falling within the scope of the Convention. 3 4 It is
important to remember however, that the Convention
'- Id. at 676.
Is0 Id. at 677.
is, Id.
132 820 F. Supp. 1218 (N.D. Cal 1993). For a discussion of the Convention's
drafting history, see supra notes 5-6. Most of the Warsaw Conference delegates
had been members of CITEJA, and had participated in the Convention's drafting.
Jack, 820 F. Supp. at 1224. The Court found that CITEJA's draft intended to
require that suits be brought "on the basis of the Convention." Id. at 1223.
1- Id. at 1226.
134 See, e.g., Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1276. The problem of allowing state law causes
of action does not seem especially grave if one looks solely to the orderliness
inherent in the Convention's presumption of airline liability and the limitation on
recovery; however, this surface unity ignores both the lurking legal chaos and
huge expenditure of time and money in litigation over choice of law, which would
be inevitable if conflicting laws from various states were available. Id.; see also Bo-
ehringer, 737 F.2d at 459 (Convention impliedly preempts state causes of action);
Velasquez, 747 F. Supp. at 676 (senseless to hold that the Convention allows sepa-
rate state causes of action to supersede its exclusivity given its concern for
uniformity).
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does not set forth such particulars as the elements of dam-
ages recoverable under its causes of action.' 35 Thus, the
Convention's provisions must in effect be supplemented
by the courts.1 36 Several of the courts that have consid-
ered this problem have held that federal common law
should decide such issues.1 37
The Convention's goal of uniformity would clearly be
advanced by establishing the Warsaw cause of action as
exclusive. An additional solution is also possible if we
borrow principles from U.S. maritime jurisprudence.
Such a solution is discussed in the next section.
1.1 The Convention left certain matters such as the elements of damages to the
municipal laws of member countries. See Locherbie, 928 F.2d at 1274. This refer-
ence to local law refers to the national laws of member states and not the laws of a
nation's subdivisions. See id. (citing Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d
851, 855 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965)). This scheme is also reflected
in Article 28 of the Convention, which has been interpreted by United States
courts as a rule of general competence. It gives jurisdiction to courts in this coun-
try and leaves the designation of an appropriate court in the United States up to
United States municipal law. See GEORGErrE MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL
AIR TRANSPORT 291 (1977).
16 See supra note 135.
1-7 The Convention is not a comprehensive and exhaustive code of legal rules
that can be applied in exactly the same way in each member state. See, e.g., Block
v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 337-38 (5th Cir. 1967) (stating
that the Convention must be read in the context of the national legal systems of
the member states), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); In re Korean Air Lines Disas-
ter of Sept. 1, 1983, 664 F. Supp. 1463 (D.D.C. 1985) (commenting that the Con-
vention is not concerned with reciprocal treatment of nationals among member
states, but rather the unification of rules relating to international air transporta-
tion), afd, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 986 (1988). Thus,
the Convention does make room for member states to apply their own national
laws. Such laws, however, should be national in breadth rather than being derived
themselves from the principles of law of the member state's subdivisions. See Lock-
erbie, 928 F.2d at 1274 (citing Mertens, 341 F.2d at 855).
Several courts have been faced with the problem of defining the substantive
elements of damages recoverable under Convention-created causes of action. See,
e.g., In re Mexico City Aircrash of Oct. 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 415 (9th Cir. 1983)
(finding that the Convention created a cause of action for wrongful death and left
the questions of who would be entitled to assert the cause of action and their
respective rights up to future courts to decide; suggesting that future courts refer
to other federal statutes to fashion a federal common law); see also Lockerbie, 928
F.2d at 1278-79 (finding that Convention causes of action should be determined
by reference to federal common law rather than a federal adoption of state law
due to the need for national uniformity); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept.
1, 1983, 704 F. Supp. 1135, 1154 (D.D.C. 1988) (deciding that plaintiffs claims
for jury trial under Convention by reference to federal common law).
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PART III. GETFING PAST THE DEBATE OVER AN
EXCLUSIVE CAUSE OF ACTION: THE
SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS IN THE
GENERAL MARITIME LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES
Maritime jurists, like their aviation counterparts, have
long been concerned with achieving uniformity of sub-
stantive laws and remedies. 38  Thus, courts have tradi-
tionally recognized that it is necessary to apply federal
maritime law to all maritime torts 39 to preserve the uni-
formity of remedies and substantive law in admiralty. 40
Uniformity provides the justification for exclusive federal
admiralty jurisdiction. 141
The general maritime law of the United States is appli-
cable to all non-statutory actions cognizable in admi-
ralty. 4  As a result, the substantive law applicable to
maritime actions is the general maritime law, the rules of
which are developed exclusively according to federal
law.' 43 This applicability is true regardless of whether the
action is brought in state or federal court and irrespective
of whether the claim has been characterized in terms of
state or federal law. "
State courts are allowed to hear in personam maritime
138 See, e.g., Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 211 (1986)
(holding that the application of state laws to maritime wrongful death actions
would be as damaging to their uniformity as it is illogical).
139 The current test for whether an event triggers federal maritime law is dis-
cussed in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 253-61
(1972).
140 Hall v. Zambelli, 675 F. Supp. 1023, 1025 (S.D.W. Va. 1988). Courts apply
federal law regardless of how plaintiffs characterize the tort under the law. Id.
141 Id.
142 Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 247 U.S. 372, 382 (1918).
143 See Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1320-21 (11th Cir.
1989) (citing Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625
(1959)); Kornberg v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 741 F.2d 1332, 1334 (11 th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985)); see also In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp.
1509, 1513 (D. Alaska 1991) (applying substantive law to maritime torts is re-
quired by maritime law).
144 See Chelentis, 247 U.S. at 382; Keefe, 867 F.2d at 1321 (holding that the same
principles would have governed outcome of a case now in federal court if it had
remained in state court); Exxon, 767 F. Supp. at 1514.
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causes of action by virtue of the "savings to suitors"
clause found in 28 U.S.C. § 1333.145 Under the "savings
to suitors" clause, rights and claims allowed by maritime
law can be enforced through a remedy at law in tort or
contract. 14
6
It is important to note, however, that the "savings to
suitors" clause does not affect the application of substan-
tive maritime law.' 47 Thus, a plaintiff cannot elect to have
the defendant's liability measured by common law stan-
dards other than those of the maritime law.' 48 In the
words of the United States Supreme Court: "the extent to
which state law may be used to remedy maritime injuries
is constrained by a so-called "reverse-Erie" doctrine
which requires that the substantive remedies afforded by
the states conform to governing federal maritime stan-
dards."' 49 Remedies created by state statutes are not en-
forceable in state court actions under the "savings to
suitors" clause if the legislation contravenes an essential
purpose expressed by an act of Congress, creates a mate-
rial prejudice to the characteristic features of general mar-
itime law, or interferes with the proper harmony and
uniformity of that law in its international and interstate
relations. 50
By contrast, aviation plaintiffs choosing to word their
actions under state law can apply state substantive law to
their claims in restrictive states.' 5' In those jurisdictions,
state laws can provide their own different elements of
damages 52 subject only to the limitation that such recov-
erable damages not be inconsistent with the terms of the
Convention. 53 As discussed in Section I, this general
145 Offshore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 222-23.
146 Chelentis, 247 U.S. at 384.
'47 Exxon, 767 F. Supp. at 1513.
'48 Id.; see also In re Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Alaska 1990).
49 Offshore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 222-23.
-" See Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964 F.2d 1480 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 467 (1992).
'5' See supra Part I.
'5 Id.
'5 Courts favoring the restrictive view hold that the availability of state law
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guideline leaves far too much leeway for state-based
causes of action to be asserted and ultimately contravenes
the Convention's quest for uniformity.
Plaintiffs in federal maritime actions, like their counter-
parts in actions under the scope of the Convention, have
sought to work their way around the strictures of federal
law by wording a complaint strictly in terms of state law.
In Hess v. United States for example, plaintiff brought an
action for a maritime tort under the Oregon wrongful
death statute. 54 The Supreme Court held that the trial
court was required to apply maritime law because tort ac-
tions for injury or death occurring upon navigable waters
are within the exclusive reach of the maritime law.' 55
Likewise, the Warsaw Convention should at least be
recognized as the exclusive source of a plaintiff's right of
recovery in actions under the scope of the Convention.
Courts could apply federal common law crafted for the
Convention regardless of whether the claims are worded
in terms of state law or the Convention; and regardless of
whether plaintiffs choose a federal district court or state
court as a forum. This "reverse-Erie" principle could be
borrowed from the general maritime law and applied to
all actions governed by Warsaw.
Such a system would achieve the goals of uniformity
that are so clearly a part of the Convention's raison d'etre.
This system also would eliminate the need for the current
legal and philosophical battle over whether the Warsaw
cause of action should be exclusive. Both state and fed-
eral courts would be bound to decide Warsaw cases based
damages is not inconsistent with the terms of the Convention although some
types of damages may be recoverable in only some states and not others. See, e.g.,
Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1482 (listing cases holding that the Convention merely
preempts inconsistent state laws); id. at 1479 (expressly leaving open the possibil-
ity that plaintiffs would be permitted to pursue a state cause of action for emo-
tional distress even if Convention created no such cause of action). This would
inevitably lead to the development of different substantive laws regarding the ele-
ments of recoverable damages in actions that were all governed by the
Convention.
- 361 U.S. 314 (1960).
155 Id. at 318 n.7.
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upon the development of a federal common law crafted to
keep in line with the goals set forth in the Convention.
CONCLUSION
Considerable confusion surrounds the role of the War-
saw Convention within the United States' federal justice
system. This confusion threatens to unravel the uniform-
ity sought by the Convention's framers. Courts in this
country should recognize the Convention as the exclusive
source of a claimant's right of recovery' 56 and endeavor to
create a system of federal common law principles that
would clearly set forth a claimant's substantive and proce-
dural rights.'5 7 In the alternative, Congress should enact
legislation to achieve the same ends.'5 8
State law causes of action cannot be allowed to exist in-
dependently within a system designed for uniformity.' 9
If they are accorded a place, they should only be allowed
as a cosmetic alternative to pleading Warsaw causes of ac-
tion. "Reverse-Erie" principles should apply when state-
156 The Convention can only be the exclusive source of a claimant's right to
recover in actions under the scope of the Convention. Actions outside the scope
of the Convention are clearly subject to state law. See supra note 17.
157 See supra note 135 for a discussion of decisions that have suggested the use
of, or used, federal common law in an effort to create a uniform system of sub-
stantive and procedural rights to be applied in actions under the Convention.
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed this issue with regard to the
Convention. Id. The Court, however, has recommended the creation of federal
common law to fill substantive gaps in the general maritime law. See Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (using federal common law princi-
ples to hold that a cause of action existed under the general maritime law for
wrongful death; and determining that substantive questions such as the measure
of damages and persons entitled to recover should be answered by creating fed-
eral common law that looked to federal maritime statutes for guidance).
15 Such legislation could take the form of implementing legislation that some
courts have found to be sorely lacking in the Convention. See, e.g., Choy v. Pan
American Airways, Co., 1941 Am. Mar. Cas. 483 (S.D.N.Y.) (stating that the court
did not understand how the Convention could create a cause of action without
statutory assistance that it had not yet received).
119 The Supreme Court itself has suggested that aviation tort cases might bene-
fit from uniform substantive and procedural laws, and that such actions should
also be heard in the federal courts so as to avoid divergent results and duplicitous
litigation in multi-party cases. See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Ohio, 409 U.S.
249 (1972).
1994] WARSA W'S WINGSPAN 615
based causes of action are pleaded in state court. If the
state of the law remains otherwise, the courts that con-
tinue to allow the independent use of state law will create
a system of recovery in which fortuitous results will be
more common than predictable ones.

